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NOTE
Inadvertent Resurrection of the Equitable
Parentage Doctrine in Missouri? An
Evaluation of Motions for Third Party
Custody and Defining a “Natural Father”
Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)

Bailey M. Schamel*

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental tenets of family law is that parents have constitutionally protected rights to their children.1 The oldest protected fundamental
right for parents is that of care, custody, and control of their own children.2
Despite this parental right being established and unquestioned, courts are making surprising decisions as the rise in non-marital childbearing and non-traditional families muddles the question of which adults are best vested with legal
rights to children.3
This Note discusses the 2018 Supreme Court of Missouri decision of
Bowers v. Bowers, which awarded full custody of a child to her stepfather.4
The facts in Bowers are discussed in Part II. Part III analyzes the Missouri
Uniform Parentage Act and the approaches the Supreme Court of Missouri and
Missouri appellate courts have taken when a child’s non-biological parent
seeks full custody. Part IV explains the Supreme Court of Missouri’s rationale
in granting full custody to the stepfather through a motion for third party custody and the dissent’s disagreement. Finally, Part V discusses why the Bowers
court should not have awarded the stepparent custody as a third party and instead should have considered the stepparent to be the “natural father.” Part V

*

B.S., Business Administration, University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019. I am grateful to Professor Beck and the entire Missouri Law Review
staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note.
1. Joanna L. Grossman, Constitutional Parentage, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 307,
309 (2017).
2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in
this case – the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
3. See Grossman, supra note 1, at 307.
4. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
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explores the consequences the decision to award third party custody in this instance could entail.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case arises out of a divorce between the birth mother of a child and
the man she married, who has no biological relation to the child, and the custody battle over the child that ensued.5 In May of 2013, Jason Bowers filed for
divorce from Jessica Bowers as well as for Determination of Physical and Legal Custody and for Order of Child Support.6 Jason alleged that J.B. was “born
of the marriage,” which means he and Jessica were J.B.’s legal parents, and
asked for joint legal and physical custody of J.B. with Jessica.7 Jessica filed
two pleadings in response, denying the allegation that J.B. was “born of the
marriage” and claiming she was born prior to the marriage; however, she designated Jason as the “legal father” of J.B., which put him on equal legal footing
as Jessica, and asked for sole legal and physical custody8 of J.B. with rights of
visitation to Jason.9
Jason and Jessica Bower’s romantic relationship began in October of
2007, and it is undisputed that Jessica was pregnant with a child conceived with
a different man named Stephen Nugent when the relationship with Jason began.10 It was agreed during Jessica’s pregnancy that Jason, rather than Stephen,
should be the father of J.B.11 Stephen agreed to this decision and voluntarily
permitted Jason to act as J.B.’s father.12
Jason attended prenatal medical appointments with Jessica and was present in the delivery room when she gave birth to J.B. on April 28, 2008.13
Shortly after J.B. was born, Jessica and Jason executed a Missouri Affidavit
Acknowledging Paternity (“Acknowledgement”).14 This resulted in the State
of Missouri issuing a birth certificate naming Jason as the “father” of J.B.15 In
5. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *1–2 (Mo. Ct. App.
June 30, 2017), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. 2018).
6. Id. at *2.
7. Id.
8. When a parent has sole custody, he or she has exclusive physical (i.e., the child
lives with them) and legal (i.e., the “the right and responsibility to make major decisions
regarding the child’s welfare, including matters of education, medical care and emotional, moral and religious development”) custody rights concerning the child. The
other parent has visitation rights and can visit with the child. See Sole Custody,
FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/child-custody/sole-custody.html (last visited May
29, 2018).
9. Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *2.
10. Id. at *1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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April of 2010, about two years after J.B.’s birth, Jason and Jessica got married.16 Jessica, Jason, and J.B. resided together as a family until Jason and
Jessica split in August of 2012.17 Throughout J.B.’s life, Jason had fulfilled
the role of J.B.’s father. He taught her how to walk and how to ride a bike,
attended her medical appointments, and provided financial support.18 During
the first five years of J.B.’s life, she did not have any contact or interaction with
Stephen, nor did Stephen provide any financial support for J.B.19 Stephen also
had a tendency to leave children he fathered with other women and was not
involved in providing emotional or financial support for his children, even the
child involved in this custody dispute.20
In January of 2014, Stephen Nugent filed a Motion to Intervene and a
Third Party Respondent’s Petition for Determination of Father-Child Relationship and Order of Custody (“Motion to Intervene”).21 Stephen sought to establish his paternity rights and an award of joint legal and physical custody of J.B.,
pursuant to the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act.22 Genetic testing was performed, and it was determined there was a 99.9% probability Stephen was the
biological father of J.B.23 As a result, Jessica filed a motion to dismiss Jason’s
request for custody and support; Jason then filed an Alternative Motion for
Third Party Custody pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes section
452.375.5(5), seeking sole legal and physical custody of J.B.24
The trial court held that Stephen was unfit, unsuitable, and unable to have
custody of J.B.25 The court also found Jessica’s contravention of numerous
court orders demonstrated she was unlikely to obey future court orders requiring her to allow J.B. to have meaningful contact with Jason.26 Jessica and Jason’s inability to co-parent rendered joint custody impossible, and the court
awarded sole legal and physical custody of J.B. to Jason as a third party custodian, with rights of visitation to Jessica and no rights to Stephen (although the
court did order J.B.’s birth certificate to be amended to show Stephen, not Jason, as the father).27 Jessica appealed this decision, claiming the finding that
she was unfit or unsuitable to have custody was not based on sufficient evidence and that granting Jason sole legal and physical custody through a third
party motion was inappropriate because he was already a party to the dissolution proceeding.28
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, agreed with the trial
court’s decision.29 The court held Jessica’s disregard of J.B.’s medical needs
and inability to follow court orders, in addition to other evidence, constituted
sufficient indication of her inability to co-parent and supported the trial court’s
finding that she was unfit or unsuitable to have custody.30 Additionally, the
court held that awarding Jason sole legal and physical custody as a third party
custodian was appropriate, despite his current party status in the dissolution
proceeding, because all matters regarding custody or visitation of J.B., including paternity determinations, were heard in the same proceeding and all interested parties were given a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and to
be heard by the trial court.31 The dissent in the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District, case disagreed with how custody was awarded to Jason.32
Judge Lisa P. Page wrote the dissent and concurred in the decision granting
Jason sole legal and physical custody but disagreed with the fact that it was
granted with a third party custodian motion and argued that Jason – not Stephen
– was J.B.’s “natural father.”33 The dissenting opinion began by assuming the
majority opinion was correct in finding Jason was a third party and analyzed
the holding as if Stephen were the natural father of J.B.34 Even if this were the
case, the dissent argued third party custody was wholly inappropriate.35 Judge
Page cited D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K. and stated the custody of J.B. could not procedurally be decided within the dissolution of Jessica and Jason if Stephen is
J.B.’s natural father.36 Accordingly, the dissent believed the proceedings in
which Jason’s claim might possibly have correctly been adjudicated were
within Stephen’s paternity action or independent cause of action.37 However,
even though the majority held Jason’s motion for third party custody was correct procedurally, the dissent still raised substantive issues.38
Despite this confusion regarding the procedural requirements, the dissent
argued the substantive law governing the adjudication of third party custody
was not confusing.39 The dissent argued that in order for a third party to be
granted custody, according to Missouri common law, the third party needs to
show that both parents are unfit or the welfare of the child requires and it is in

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5 (Page, J., dissenting).
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K., 428 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
(“[T]he court does not have the authority in a dissolution proceeding to determine the
custody of children not born of the marriage or adopted by the parties.”)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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the best interest of the child for the petitioner to be the custodian of the child.40
The dissent agreed with Stephen’s unfitness but argued that the trial court’s
determination of Jessica as unfit was tied to her inability to co-parent with Jason.41 After determining that Jessica was unfit, the trial court awarded Jessica
physical custody five of fourteen nights, so the dissent argued she was apparently not an unfit parent outside her inability to co-parent with Jason.42 After
disagreeing with the trial court’s holding of Jessica as unfit, the dissent also
argued that affirming this award pursuant to the third-party provision in section
453.375.5(5) based on the “welfare of the child” was wholly inappropriate because in the few cases where trial courts have divested a biological parent of
custodial rights premised upon the “welfare of the child,” the facts are much
more egregious than in the Bowers’ case, and custody in those cases is often
awarded to a biological relative, not a former stepparent.43 The dissent cited
both Giesler v. Giesler and K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K. in support of this
statement.44 The dissent believed that an award of third party custody should
not be premised on a natural parent and former stepparent’s inability to get
along.45
The dissent stated that a Missouri requirement for awarding third party
custody is the unfitness of both parents.46 Jessica was not unfit because her
conduct, while reprehensible, was not comparable to the cases in which Missouri has awarded third party custody like Giesler and K.S.H., and Jason should
not be awarded third party custody, assuming Stephen is the natural father.47
Jason did not provide enough evidence to rebut the presumption of fitness of
Jessica as a parent.48 By granting third party custody to Jason, the dissent argued the majority opinion inadvertently resurrected the concept of “equitable
parentage,” which the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected.49
The dissent further stated the majority avoided the question of law as to
whether Jason could actually be designated as a third party and either (1) presupposed the designation was appropriate as a matter of law or (2) conflated
three possible separate causes of action – dissolutions, paternity, and an independent third party custody petition – and failed to clarify to which action Jason

40. Id. (citing Jones v. Jones, 10 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)); see also
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
41. Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *5 (Page, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Giesler v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
third party custodial rights to aunt and uncle of children); K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K.,
355 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming third party custody because there was
evidence of abuse)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at *7.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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was a third party.50 This affirmation of the third party custody award did not
address the point on appeal and inappropriately focused on procedural issues,
rather than substantive issues, and the dissent stated it was inappropriate to
designate Jason as a third party as he should be considered J.B.’s “natural father.”51
The dissent based its opinion that Jason should be considered the “natural
father” on statutory interpretation of four statutes: sections 210.834.4, 210.823,
210.822.1, and 210.822.2 of the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act.52 It initially
seemed problematic that section 210.834.4 states whenever the blood tests
show a person presumed or alleged to be the father of a child is not the father
of a child, it is conclusive of non-paternity.53 However, the dissent argued that
even though in most cases Stephen’s genetic test results would guarantee him
the ability to rebut by clear and convincing evidence all other “presumed natural fathers,” that was not true in this case.54 The dissent argued this is because
the execution of an Acknowledgment of Paternity seven years before Stephen’s
cause of action constituted a legal finding of paternity and established Jason as
J.B.’s natural father.55
The dissent argued that this is a matter of statutory interpretation and
quoted a Missouri case that stated, “[W]e presume that the legislature did not
insert superfluous language or idle verbiage in a statute.”56 Therefore, the dissent argued that because these two statutes both create legal findings of paternity, the court was required to move to the second step of section 210.822.2
and resolve the conflict of presumed fatherhood between Jason and Stephen.57
The dissent argued that sections 210.832 and 210.822.2 provided a basis for
Jason to be considered the “natural father” because the Paternity Acknowledgment affidavit resulted in Jason’s name being listed on J.B.’s birth certificate.58
This Acknowledgement creates conflicting presumptions of who the “natural
father” is between Jason and Stephen, and the dissent believed it should be
resolved in Jason’s favor using the “weightier considerations of policy and
logic.”59
The dissent believed determining whom the trial court should select as
the father based on “weightier considerations of policy and logic” between a
man who is the biological father of a child and a man who has successfully
completed an Acknowledgement of Paternity for the same child was an issue

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *13–16.
See id. at *16; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 210.834.4 (2016).
Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *16 (Page, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (quoting Dubinsky v. St. Louis Blues Hockey Club, 229 S.W.3d 126, 130
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *17.
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of first impression in Missouri courts and the court was without guidance.60
The dissent examined cases from other jurisdictions and found that the Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted the standard of “weightier considerations of
policy and logic” to allow courts to consider both the sociological and psychological consequences of its decision as to which man should be considered the
natural father.61 Other states, like Colorado and California, also allow for factintensive inquiries and consider the child’s well-being.62 According to the dissent, based upon the decisions of other states, Stephen’s inability to present any
evidence as to why he should prevail in consideration of policy and logic, and
Jason’s consistent presence in J.B.’s life as well as J.B’s attachment to Jason,
Jason should be deemed the “natural father” of J.B.63
Lastly, the dissent discussed its agreement with the trial court in awarding
Jason sole physical and legal custody of J.B. with visitation rights to Jessica.64
The dissent’s support of this decision was based on the determination that J.B.
is a “child of the marriage” because of the execution of the Paternity Acknowledgment and the subsequent marriage.65 Because Jason, in the dissent’s mind,
was considered the “natural father” of J.B., the trial court’s award of full custody to him over Jessica was not against the great weight of the evidence, and
deference to the trial court’s decision would be appropriate.66
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court and the appeals
court, holding the trial court correctly designated Jason “a third-party solely for
the purpose of determining custody” and determined awarding custody to Jason as a third-party “was not against the weight of the evidence.”67

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Two important areas of Missouri law inform the analysis of the Bowers
decision: the “equitable parentage” doctrine in relation to awards for third party
custody and the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act (“MoUPA”).

A. “Equitable Parentage” Doctrine and Awards for Third Party
Custody
Because the ideas of past awards for third party custody and the equitable
parentage doctrine are so interrelated, they are discussed together below.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing GDK v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo.

2004)).
62. Id. (citing N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000) (en banc); Craig L.
v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).
63. Id. at *18.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *20.
67. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 615, 617 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
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1. Past Awards for and Against Third Party Custody in Missouri
Section 452.375.5 of the Missouri statutory code describes the situations
in which third party custody may be awarded.68 The statute provides two
grounds for which third party custody, temporary custody, or visitation may be
granted: 1) when the court finds that the welfare of a child requires third party
custody and such custody is in the best interest of the child, or 2) when the
court finds that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian.69
In addition, the courts must find the third parties “to be suitable and able to
provide an adequate and stable environment for the child.”70 The following
cases have interpreted parental fitness and the situations in which the welfare
of the child requires an award of third party custody.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the trial court’s
award of third party custody to the children’s paternal aunt and uncle in Giesler.71 In Giesler, the father was absent, and the court concluded the mother
“was unable to cope with the demands of parenthood.”72 The mother failed to
take the children to school, failed to pick them up from school, failed to demonstrate any interest in the children’s school progress, failed to timely obtain the
children’s immunizations, failed to obtain child-care for the children while she
was at work, and failed to provide a stable home.73 The evidence also indicated
that the mother moved into the home of her boyfriend while still married and
that the boyfriend directed vile language toward the children and physically
abused the mother.74 The aunt and uncle were granted custody as third parties
because the court determined they were best suited to care for the child.75
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the trial
court’s grant of third party custody in K.S.H. in 2011.76 In this case, custody
was awarded to the child’s grandmother rather than to the natural parents because “there was evidence of physical abuse, emotional abuse, a chaotic home
environment, neglect of health needs, the lack of a healthy parent-child relationship, emotional manipulation, and consistent poor judgment by [the
m]other.”77 A school nurse noticed bruises and red welts on the child’s arms
and made a hotline call to Family Services.78 The living situation was unsafe
for the child, and the court awarded custody to the grandmother because the
welfare of the child required it.79
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
Id.
Id. § 452.375.5(5)(a).
Giesler v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K., 355 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 521.
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Alternatively, Missouri courts have rejected third party custody, albeit in
earlier cases. A Missouri court has held section 452.375.5, the statute that governs motions for third party custody, “creat[es] a rebuttable presumption that
parents are fit, suitable, and able custodians of their children and that their welfare is best served by awarding their custody to their parents.”80 The Missouri
Court of Appeals, Southern District, reversed the trial court’s ruling in In re
Marriage of Horinek in 2001.81 In Horinek, the court reversed an award of
third party custody to paternal grandparents because they failed to sufficiently
rebut this presumption of fitness of the child’s mother.82 The trial court cited
several reasons for finding the mother unfit, including: the mother’s proposal
to remove the child to Florida and leave the child in the care of the maternal
grandmother a majority of the time while the mother went to school, the fact
that the mother’s proposed move would sever the child’s relationship with her
father and father’s family, the mother’s lack of maturity, the child’s strong relationship with the paternal grandparents, and the fact that the child’s primary
home was the residence of the paternal grandparents.83 The court also cited
that the mother received a discharge from the Navy based on a personality disorder, that she frequently lied to health providers, and that she may have attempted to commit suicide.84 The trial court noted a history of domestic violence between the parents but found no substantial evidence that this abuse
involved the child.85
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, stated that while the
mother had made many mistakes in her young life – including smoking marijuana three times, snorting methamphetamine twice, and drinking beer while
pregnant – the mother’s mistakes seemed directly tied to the father.86 The
mother claimed she never used drugs prior to moving to Missouri with the father.87 The father had a history of violence with the mother, and the two had
several arguments and at least two physical altercations.88 The evidence also
showed the father was much more involved in illegal drugs than was the
mother.89 However, the marriage was over and the mother then lived with the
child’s maternal grandmother in a stable, peaceful home.90 The court overturned the trial court’s decision and held the mother to be fit.91

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Flathers v. Flathers, 948 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
In re Marriage of Horinek, 41 S.W.3d 897, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 901, 908.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 908.
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2. “Equitable Parentage” Doctrine
The equitable parentage doctrine awards custody to a “better” parent instead of the natural parent because that substitution is in the best interests of
the children.92 Additionally, the doctrine implies the third party, a non-parent,
is equivalent to a natural parent and legally on equal footing.93 This doctrine
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the 1998 case Cotton v. Wise, a decision in which the court reversed an award of custody to the
children’s older sister instead of the father because Missouri’s guardianship
statute provided sufficient statutory protection over the interests of the children.94 The guardianship statute states that guardianship may be granted in
three situations: when the minor child has no living parent, when the parent or
parents of a minor are “unwilling, unable, or . . . unfit” to be a guardian, or
when the minor’s parents have had their parental rights terminated.95
The Cotton trial court awarded the sister custody of the minor children
even though the father had not been deemed unfit because placement with the
father and elimination of contact with their older sister would have negatively
affected the children’s growth and development.96 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court erred and stated the award of custody to the older
sister “must be premised upon a finding that the natural parent is unfit, unable,
or unwilling to care for his children.”97
The court may consider several factors listed in a Missouri statute when
determining the fitness of a parent, including but not limited to: any felony
violations, any history of physical and mental abuse, the willingness to actively
perform his or her functions as a parent for the needs of the child, and the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the parent.98 What may not be
considered, however, is whether the child would be “better off” with a third
party.99
Missouri courts have continued to reject the equitable parentage doctrine.
A recent example of this rejection is In re L.M.100 The In re L.M. court reversed
a grant of guardianship to the great-uncle and great-aunt of a child because “the
determination of parental unfitness may not be made by comparing the relative
merits of the parent with those of a third party seeking the guardianship over

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 475.030 (2016).
Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
See id.; see also Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264–65.
In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); see also C.L. v. M.T.,
335 S.W.3d 19, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]o the extent that the circuit court established a guardianship over the child . . . based solely upon the best interests of the child,
it was in error.”).
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the child.”101 The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed the
trial court because it considered the best interests of the child in deciding custody between the father, great-uncle, and great-aunt before first determining
whether the father was fit to have custody.102 The trial court should have first
determined whether the father was fit using the statutory considerations before
awarding guardianship to a third party in light of the presumption the father
was the child’s appropriate custodian.103 The court must focus on the parent’s
ability to provide for the child on his or her own – it cannot compare the merits
of the parent to the third party.104

B. Missouri Uniform Parentage Act (MoUPA) and Other Relevant
Statutes
Section 210 of the Missouri statutory code includes the MoUPA.105 It
was first enacted in 1987, encompassing sections 210.817 to 210.854, and its
purpose “was to establish a uniform means for deciding paternity that would
protect the rights of all parties involved, especially children.”106 This act has
several provisions that are relevant to Bowers, including sections 210.834.4,
210.823, 210.822.1, and 210.822.2.
Section 210.834 generally covers the law of blood tests in regard to custody battles.107 Specifically, section 210.834.4 states, “Whenever the court
finds . . . the results of the blood tests show that a person presumed or alleged
to be the father of the child is not the father of such child, such evidence shall
be conclusive of nonpaternity and the court shall dismiss the action as to that
party.”108 The plain language of this statute shows Missouri’s tendency to favor the biological father in custody decisions in that a blood test indicating
paternity trumps all other findings of fatherhood.109 The Revised Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission for states to use as
a model, has replaced blood tests with genetic testing, but Missouri’s Uniform
Parentage Act does not reflect this replacement and relies strictly on blood
tests.110
Section 210.823 details that an acknowledgement of paternity is considered a legal finding of paternity.111 It states that a signed acknowledgment
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d at 216.
Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 217.
See id.
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 210.817–210.854 (2016).
State v. Dodd, 961 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
§ 210.834.
Id. § 210.834.4.
See id.
See generally UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
111. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823.1 (2016).
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“shall be considered a legal finding of paternity subject to the right of either
signatory to rescind the acknowledgment.”112 This rescission must be filed
within the earlier of “sixty days from the date of the last signature” or “[t]he
date of an administrative or judicial proceeding to establish a support order in
which the signatory is a party.”113 The acknowledgment can be challenged in
court on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake.114 However, if the
acknowledgement of paternity is unchallenged, a judicial or administrative proceeding is not required to ratify it.115
Sections 210.822.1 and 210.822.2 discuss when a man shall be presumed
to be the natural father of a child and when that presumption can be rebutted.116
Several classes of men are presumed to be the natural father, including men
who “[a]n expert concludes that the blood tests show that the alleged parent is
not excluded and that the probability of paternity is ninety-eight percent or
higher.”117 Section 210.822.2 discusses that “[a] presumption pursuant to [section 210.822] may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.”118 It also provides that “[i]f two or more presumptions arise
which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”119 Missouri
courts have held the correct analysis under section 210.822.2 is to first determine whether clear and convincing evidence rebuts the presumption that a presumed natural father is actually the natural father.120 If the first step leaves
more than one presumed natural father, the trial court then must determine
which of the remaining presumed natural fathers is founded on the “weightier
considerations of policy and logic.”121 The dissent in the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Eastern District, opinion in Bowers claimed that these considerations
were an issue of first impression for the court.122
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, applied sections
210.832 and 210.822.2 in Courtney v. Roggy.123 In Roggy, the six-year-old
child over which custody was being determined was born during the husband
and wife’s marriage, and both the husband and the wife were named on the
child’s birth certificate.124 The husband and wife were both aware the husband
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 210.823.1(2).
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 210.822.1, 210.822.2 (2016).
Id. § 210.822.1.
Id. § 210.822.2.
Id.
Courtney v. Roggy, 302 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
Id.
Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App.
June 30, 2017) (Page, J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo.
2018).
123. Roggy, 302 S.W.3d at 146–48.
124. Id. at 144.
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was not the child’s biological father.125 While the husband and wife were still
married, the biological father of the child filed an action to determine paternity
and wanted to be declared the father of the child.126 The biological father had
several contacts with the child, including trips out of town and holidays.127 The
trial court granted the petition and determined that the biological father’s blood
test was clear and convincing evidence that rebutted the husband’s presumption
as the child’s natural father.128 The Roggy court did not touch the “weightier
considerations of policy and logic” issue because no conflicting presumptions
existed; the DNA test trumped all other findings of paternity.129
Another relevant statute to consider, which is not within the Uniform Parentage Act, is section 452.375 of Missouri’s statutory code.130 This statute
provides information regarding the determination of custody within a dissolution of marriage and the relevant factors a court may consider when awarding
custody of a child.131 These factors include but are not limited to: the wishes
of the child’s parents, the need of the child for a meaningful relationship with
both parents, the ability and willingness of the child’s parents to perform their
functions as parents for the needs of the child, which parent is going to allow
the child contact with the other parent, and any history of abuse.132

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judge George W. Draper wrote the majority opinion, holding that the evidence relied upon by the trial court supported the finding that Jessica was unfit
to have custody of J.B. and that Jason was entitled to sole physical and legal
custody advanced by his third party custody motion with visitation rights to
Jessica.133 Judge Zel M. Fischer concurred in the result but filed a separate
opinion holding that Jessica’s first point relied on, which argued the finding
she was unfit was not supported by substantial evidence, preserved nothing for
appellate review.134 Judge Fischer’s opinion, while important, is not relevant
to the argument made by this Note and is therefore not discussed below – only
Judge Draper’s opinion is discussed.
The court first addressed the procedural issues and discussed Jessica’s
reliance on a Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, case entitled In re
Marriage of Said to support her argument that “because Jason already was a

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 145–47.
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
Id. § 452.375.2.
Id.
Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 610, 616–17 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
Id. at 617–18 (Fischer, C.J., concurring).
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party to the dissolution, he. . .could not be designated as a third party for purposes of custody.”135 Jessica argued In re Marriage of Said supported her position because the Southern District dismissed a stepfather’s claim of custody
during a dissolution proceeding.136 However, the majority stated Jason’s motion for third-party custody was different from In re Marriage of Said because
the Southern District’s holding was limited to the “extraordinary facts” of the
case.137
The majority held Jason’s case was factually different in that Jason did
not assert his position as the stepparent as a ground for custody, as the stepparent incorrectly did in In re Marriage of Said.138 The majority also argued another factual difference was that Jason alleged both Jessica and Stephen were
unfit to be J.B.’s custodians, something that was not done in In re Marriage of
Said.139 Additionally, the majority stated that the record showed after the dissolution was filed by Jason, “Jessica actively sought out Stephen” and encouraged him “to assert his paternity rights.”140 The record also showed Jessica
helped Stephen get an attorney to file his claim for custody.141 The majority
stated that the court was “disinclined to grant Jessica relief based on error she
actively invited” and found the trial court “did not err” when it designated Jason as a third party to determine custody.142
Next, the majority discussed Jessica’s argument that the trial court’s finding of her unfitness was in error.143 The majority listed seven reasons that supported the trial court’s finding, four of which were about her inability to coparent with Jason and her unwillingness to let Jason see the child.144 The other
three were: her disregard for J.B.’s medical needs, intending to remove J.B.
from her current school, and placing her own interests ahead of J.B.’s.145 While
the majority recognized the presumption “that the best interest of a child is best
served by vesting custody of the child with” a biological parent, it argued this
presumption can be rebutted.146 In order to rebut this presumption, a third party
that seeks custody has to show that each parent is unfit or the welfare of the
child requires third party custody.147
The court also noted that Jason is not just any third party, but rather his
third-party claim “is being asserted by an individual . . . specifically invited by
a biological parent to act as a parent of the [child] at issue, and in fact acted in
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 614–15.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 616.
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that capacity for an extended period of time.”148 The majority stated that it
would not reweigh the evidence, and it believed that Jessica did not present any
evidence that demonstrated the circuit court’s judgment was in error.149 The
majority also stated that while it was not required to find the child’s welfare
required the award of third-party custody, Jessica’s intention to destroy the relationship between the child and Jason could support the trial court’s finding
that the welfare of J.B. required Jason to have custody.150 The Supreme Court
of Missouri affirmed the circuit court and the appellate court.151

V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in this case operationally alters
the standard for grants of third party custody in Missouri. The dissenting opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals has the better legal analysis both procedurally and substantively in regard to the motion for third party custody and
would have denied the motion and written a much deeper discussion on the
substantive issues. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s failure to follow the dissenting opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals has inadvertently resurrected
the “equitable parentage” doctrine. This Part concludes by discussing why Jason should have been considered the “natural father” and awarded custody or,
in the alternative, Jessica should have been awarded custody.

A. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Misapplication of the Legal
Standard for Third Party Custody Awards
Awarding custody of a child to the stepfather in this case through a motion
for third custody is wholly inappropriate. While some confusion surrounds the
procedural legal authority that governs awards of third party custody, it is clear
that a child’s custody cannot be decided within the proceedings for dissolution
of marriage if both parties are not the natural parents.152 Missouri courts have
held that “the court does not have the authority in a dissolution proceeding to
determine the custody of children not born of the marriage or adopted by the
parties.”153 Although the procedural issues are important, this Note primarily
focuses on the substantive issue in Bowers regarding third party custody motions, which is in stark contrast with Missouri law. In order to award third
148. Id. (quoting McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 447–48 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015)) (alteration in original).
149. Id. at 616–17.
150. Id. at 617.
151. Id.
152. See D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K. v. D.L.T., 428 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013);
see also In re Marriage of Said, 26 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (stating a
custody action was “foreign to the dissolution action” and that it should have been a
“separate action” and not adjudicated in the dissolution proceeding).
153. D.S.K., 428 S.W.3d at 659.
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party custody over the child’s natural parents, Missouri law is clear that the
third party must first show that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be
a custodian or that the welfare of the child requires third party custody and that
it is the best interest of the child.154
The trial court and Supreme Court of Missouri’s finding of Jessica’s unfitness is focused almost solely on the hostility between herself and the child’s
former stepfather, Jason.155 In particular, the Supreme Court of Missouri focused its finding of unfitness on Jessica’s failure to follow court orders and her
attempts to destroy the bond between the child and Jason.156 While this behavior is reprehensible, this consideration is inappropriate.157 Prior decisions focus the finding of a parent’s unfitness in motions for third party custody on the
parent’s behavior alone and not on whether the parent will allow the third party
to see the child.158
After finding her to be unfit, the trial court awarded Jessica five out of
fourteen nights of physical custody.159 The majority in the Missouri Court of
Appeals seemed to confirm this contradictory finding, supporting its reasoning
by quoting section 452.375.2 and stating that one of the relevant factors in determining parental fitness is “[w]hich parent is more likely to allow the child
frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with the other parent.”160 The
Supreme Court of Missouri also seemed to confirm this contradictory finding
by affirming the trial court.161 However, under a third party motion for custody, Jason is not a parent. Jason is a third party and legally a non-parent.
Outside of this inability to co-parent, the court did not mention another finding
supporting the determination that Jessica was unfit, aside from her disregard of
the child’s medical needs, sometimes placing her own interests before the
child’s, and intending to remove the child from her current school.162 While
these issues are important considerations, it does not rise to the same level of
conduct as the parents in the previous cases in which third party custody was
awarded.
Section 452.375.5 includes the statutory requirements for third-party custody that have been read to “creat[e] a rebuttable presumption that parents are
fit, suitable, and able custodians of their children and that their welfare is best
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.5(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 615.
See id.
See Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264–65 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
See Giesler v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming third
party custodial rights to aunt and uncle of children); see also K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v.
C.K., 355 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming third party custody because there
was evidence of abuse).
159. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App.
June 30, 2017) (Page, J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo.
2018).
160. Id. at *3 (majority opinion) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2 (2016)).
161. See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 616–17.
162. See id.
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served by awarding their custody to their parents.”163 The inability to co-parent
with a third party is arguably not enough evidence to overcome this presumption. In the few cases where Missouri courts have awarded custody to a third
party over a biological parent, the behavior at issue is much more egregious.164
In Giesler, third party custody rights were granted to the aunt and uncle of
minor children because the father was absent and the mother did several things
to show she could not cope with the demands of parenthood.165 The mother
failed to take the children to and from school, failed to timely obtain their immunizations, and lived with a physically abusive boyfriend who often caused
discord in the custody matters between the parties.166 In K.S.H., custody of a
child was granted to the grandmother because “there was evidence of physical
abuse, emotional abuse, a chaotic home environment, neglect of health needs,
the lack of a healthy parent-child relationship, emotional manipulation, and
consistent poor judgment by [the m]other.”167
No facts as weighty as those seen in K.S.H. and Giesler support the unfitness finding in this case. Jessica did not fail to take the child to school, and she
did not expose the child to abuse. Instead, the court found her to be unfit mostly
due to her potential to destroy the bond between the child and Jason. It should
be reiterated that Jason is, in this case, a non-genetic parent.
The facts in Bowers more closely align with the facts in cases in which
third party custody was denied. In Horinek, the court held an award of third
party custody to the child’s paternal grandparents was inappropriate despite the
mother’s illegal drug use and other problematic behavior because the behavior
was tied to her ex-husband whom she would no longer have to parent with.168
Simply removing Jason, the third party, from Jessica’s and the child’s life
would eliminate the reasons for Jessica’s unfitness. The court recognized this
as a course of action in Horinek.169 Jessica may not be the perfect parent; however, her actions do not rise to a level justifying an award of third party custody
to Jason. While she seemingly does not want her child to have a relationship
with Jason, she still provides for J.B., gives J.B. what she needs, and does not
put J.B. in dangerous situations.170 In ruling this way, the court has inadvertently resurrected the equitable parentage doctrine.

163. Flathers v. Flathers, 948 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
164. See Bowers, 2017 WL 2822506, at *6 (Page, J., dissenting); see also Giesler

v. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming third party custodial rights
to aunt and uncle of children); K.S.H. ex rel. M.S.H. v. C.K., 355 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2011) (affirming third party custody because there was evidence of abuse).
165. Giesler, 800 S.W.2d at 60–61.
166. Id.
167. K.S.H., 355 S.W.3d at 521.
168. In re Marriage of Horinek, 41 S.W.3d 897, 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
169. Id.
170. See Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *6 (Mo. Ct.
App. June 30, 2017) (Page., J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608 (Mo.
2018).
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B. Resurrection of the “Equitable Parentage” Doctrine
Although the majority in the Missouri Court of Appeals explicitly denied
addressing equitable parenting, its award of third party custody to Jason, and
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s affirmance, arguably resurrects the equitable
parentage doctrine, which the Supreme Court of Missouri disavowed.171 The
equitable parentage doctrine, as described above,172 awards custody to the “better” parent instead of the natural parent when that substitution seems to be in
the best interests of the children.173 Missouri courts have held “the determination of parental unfitness may not be made by comparing the relative merits of
the parent with those of a third party seeking the guardianship over the
child.”174 Guardianship and custody are similar concepts but differ slightly in
the courts in which they are determined and the nature of the relationship between the child and the adult.175 A guardianship is a court-ordered relationship
where the adult makes decisions about aspects like the child’s education.176 A
guardian can be appointed even when a biological parent has custody and provides care for the child.177 However, an important similarity between guardianship and custody is that both statutes governing third party awards require a
finding of unfitness of the parents before an award of custody to a third party.178
Bowers is factually similar to Cotton, in which an award of custody to the
sister of minor children was reversed, despite the strong relationship between
the children and their sister, because the award of custody “must be premised
upon a finding that the natural parent is unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for
his children.”179 While the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bowers claimed to
have found Jessica unfit, this finding is insufficient and appears to be related
to what the court believed is within the best interests of the child.180 The thorough discussion in the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion of the strong relationship between the child and Jason and the potential for significant harm if

171. See id. at *7; see also Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en

banc).
172.
173.
174.
175.

See discussion supra at Part III.A.2.
Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264.
In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
See generally Difference Between Custody and Guardianship, 7TH JUD. CIR.
CT., http://www.circuit7.net/familycourt/parentplan/custody-guardianship.aspx (last
visited May 29, 2018).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 475.030 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. §
452.375.5(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
179. Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
180. See Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 616–17 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
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this relationship were destroyed underscores the relationship between this analysis and the court’s holding.181 The focus of Jessica’s “unfitness” was on her
potential to destroy J.B. and Jason’s relationship.182
The Supreme Court of Missouri compared the relative merits of Jessica,
the child’s natural mother, with those of Jason, a third party, by discussing her
unwillingness to co-parent with him.183 Comparing the merits of a natural parent to a third party when determining fitness and putting a third party on equal
footing with a natural parent has been expressly disallowed.184 Finding Jessica
as unfit should make no mention of comparing her abilities to that of a third
party. The majority did this by emphasizing that Jessica attempted to eliminate
Jason’s role in J.B.’s life.185 Without explicitly stating it, the Supreme Court
of Missouri held that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain a relationship
with Jason, a third party and a non-parent, and put him on equal footing with
Jessica, the child’s natural mother. The Supreme Court of Missouri treated the
child’s relationship with Jason, who the court had ruled is a third party, as
equally important to the child’s relationship with the child’s natural mother and
therefore inadvertently resurrected the equitable parentage doctrine by extending the constitutional rights to a non-genetic parent third party. This could have
unfortunate, unintended consequences, which are described below.
The court in Bowers did not follow legally-binding precedent, which is a
grave legal error. The Supreme Court should have upheld its disallowance of
the equitable parentage doctrine because enacting it could lead to dire consequences. Setting this precedent with such a low standard for motions for third
party custody will likely open the floodgates and is easily subject to abuse.
Stepparents will likely now file for third party custody during marriage dissolution proceedings in order to obtain unfair bargaining power over their
spouses. This is especially troubling in domestic violence cases; an abusive
husband whose abuse has not been revealed to the court and who is the stepfather of a child could easily exert control over the child’s birth mother and gain
custody. Additionally, parents are awarded certain constitutional rights; to extend these constitutional rights to every stepparent without specific justification
seems inherently wrong. Because of this case, it is going to be easier for stepparents and other third parties to gain custody of a child, which is something
Missouri has been and should be opposed to.

C. Awarding Custody to the Correct Person
In order to avoid the precedent set by awarding Jason third party custody,
the Supreme Court of Missouri should have awarded him custody by ruling
181.
182.
183.
184.

See id. at 617.
See id.
Id. at 615–17.
In re L.M., 488 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at

264.
185. See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 617.
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him to be the “natural father” of the child. Section 210.834.4 states that whenever the blood tests show a person presumed or alleged to be the father of a
child is not the father of a child, it is conclusive of non-paternity.186 Because
Stephen’s DNA test showed that he was the biological father, this seems to
show that Stephen is, in fact, the natural father. However, Jason and Jessica
executed an Acknowledgment of Paternity seven years before the blood test
showed Stephen was the biological father.187 Section 210.823 states that an
Acknowledgment of Paternity constitutes a legal finding of paternity “subject
to the right of either signatory to rescind the acknowledgment.”188 This legally
established Jason as the child’s “natural father,” creating conflicting presumptions of natural fatherhood between Stephen and Jason, and the court is required to evaluate under section 210.822.2 which man should be presumed the
natural father under “weightier considerations of policy and logic.”189 This is
an issue of first impression for Missouri courts, but other states have allowed
for the consideration of the child’s best interests and the sociological and psychological effects of the decision.190
Stephen has not been in the child’s life since birth and has had no contact
with the child until he filed his motion to intervene.191 He also had a tendency
to leave children he fathered with other women and was not involved in providing emotional or financial support for his children, even the child involved in
this custody dispute.192 Jason, on the other hand, has been in the child’s life
since birth and raised the child.193 He also provided financial support and is
the only father the child has ever known.194 It only makes sense to resolve the
weightier considerations of policy and logic in his favor. If Jason were legally
considered to be the “natural father” as he should have been through the execution of the Paternity Acknowledgement, the court’s consideration of Jessica’s inability to co-parent under section 452.375(2) would have been legally
justified and the award of custody to Jason would have been appropriate.
Even if this argument is unsuccessful, the award of custody to Jason
through the third-party motion was inappropriate because the finding of Jessica
as unfit was based on the comparison of her actions to Jason’s, instead of on
her actions alone. If Jason is not considered the “natural father,” Jessica should
be awarded sole physical and legal custody.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

MO. REV. STAT. § 210.834.4 (2016).
See Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 610.
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823.1 (2016).
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.822.2 (2016).
See, e.g., GDK v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2004);
N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
191. Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED 103176, 2017 WL 2822506, at *17 (Mo. Ct. App.
June 30, 2017) (Page, J., dissenting), transferred en banc to 543 S.W.3d 608.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *18.
194. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Parental rights are constitutionally protected.195 Allotting these constitutional rights to non-parents of children without holding them to the correct
standards could have dire consequences. In Bowers, the court dealt with a custody battle between a mother, a stepfather, and the child’s biological father.
The court incorrectly applied the standard for third party custody and, in doing
so, inadvertently resurrected the equitable parentage doctrine, which has been
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The court improperly
compared the merits of a parent and non-parent in this determination of custody.196 The Supreme Court of Missouri should not have confirmed the award
of third party custody to Jason and instead should have held Jason to be the
child’s “natural father.” Because it did not do so, this decision could have
unfortunate consequences on motions for third party custody in the state of
Missouri and will likely affect parents’ rights, the protection of which is vital
to upholding constitutional rights – one of the fundamental purposes of courts
in the United States.

195. Grossman, supra note 1, at 309.
196. See id.; Bowers, 543 S.W.3d at 615–17.
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